Wednesday 23 May 2012

Criminal Justice in East Timor and the Constitution of East Timor

2008 ETLJ 3 Criminal Justice in East Timor and the Constitution of East Timor Dr Anton Girginov Ph D

1. In accordance with its Sections 2, 62, 121, 149, and 161, the Constitution of East Timor is the legal basis for East Timorese legislation and also has direct applicability. The Constitution provides the basic legal framework and plays the most important role for any sector which it governs: it could be very positive and productive, if the texts of its provisions are successful, or, on the contrary, very negative and counterproductive, if unsuccessful.

In this connection it is worth mentioning that the Constitution of East Timor contains several provisions which are closely related to criminal justice. Most of them though need significant improvement, as their texts are not in line with the criminal law tradition and theory and, in particular, with the tradition and theory of civil law countries to which East Timor belongs. Moreover, the deviations from the criminal law tradition and theory in practice hinder the operation of criminal justice and the protection of legal interests in East Timor.

2. In Section 31 (Application of criminal law) of the Constitution alone there are two such texts which might be criticized. The first one is item 3. It reads:

“Penalties and security measures not provided for in law at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be enforced”.

Undoubtedly, the text, designed to ban the retroactivity of all subsequent laws on penalties and security measures, comes from the principle of Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali [Latin: “No Crime, no Penalty without a Previous Penal/Criminal Law”] and, in particular, from its second part which is also enshrined in Article 11(2)(ii) of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 15(1)(ii) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

As a Party to both of the two International Human Rights Instruments, East Timor has implemented this rule of nulla poena sine praevia lege to penalties by imposing a derivative ban on retroactivity of laws on them. Additionally, East Timor has extended this derivative ban on retroactivity beyond the scope of the abovementioned International Instruments, to the other type of sanctions, namely: the safety measures or, at least, those of them which might be defined as substantive security measures (most often, such of compulsory medical treatment). As no such or similar extension of the ban on retroactivity is imposed, nor prohibited in International Law, each particular country, including East Timor, is free to decide what to do: whether to extend the operation of the ban on retroactivity to any or all of its safety (security or/and restrictive) measures or not. It is a matter of her discretion. Yet, the whole idea of banning law retroactivity, generally confined to penalties only[1], is exceptional. Hence, its enlargement to include the said measures (inevitably, at the expense of the general rule), though legally valid, might be justified, as any other exception, for very serious reasons only.

However, no one can seriously justify the treatment in the same way as penalties of security measures and compulsory medical measures, in particular, including medical measures that are provided for in the Criminal Code [CC] because they follow deeds proscribed there. It is true though that the measures in question are traditionally governed together with penalties by the same CC, and not in administrative law which is the case with all other medical measures. Nevertheless, even these medical measures, provided for in substantive criminal law, are, by nature, much closer to the restrictive measures provided for in procedural criminal law, rather than to penalties. Both, medical measures and restrictive measures are, in contrast to penalties, not orientated towards the crime and not proportionate to it. The said measures are designed to neutralize a specific danger within the actor (ill or/and suspect); that is why they are orientated towards this danger and are proportionate to it. Thus, procedural restrictive measures are designed to neutralize the danger to the successful completion of the criminal proceedings coming from the actor and, above all, to secure his/her presence there. Likewise, medical measures are designed to neutralize the danger to the health of the actor, his/her family and/or other persons coming from the same actor in cases where s/he suffers from some mental or other illness. Therefore, the medical measures are always taken and justified only until the said danger, coming from the actor, still exists. This is expressly recognized and confirmed in Article 2(2)(x) of Law No. 16/2005 for Legislative Authorization on Criminal Matters which reads: “the security measure had to be grounded in the danger posed by the perpetrator”.

Furthermore, it should be taken into account that as the procedural restrictive measures, in particular, are not orientated towards the crime, the law applicable to them with respect to time is normally the law which is in force at the time when they are taken rather than the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime[2]. Although the crime was committed prior to the entry into force of the new law, this law is not retroactive as it is orientated and applied to measures taken after its entry into force. Hence, if after the crime’s commission a new procedural law comes into force and this law introduces a new (expectedly, more efficient) restrictive measure, the new measure might be normally taken. Likewise, as the medical measures are not orientated towards the crime, the law applicable to them with respect to time should be normally the law which is in force at the time when they are taken rather than the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime[3]. Again, there is no retroactivity of this law as it is orientated and applied to measures taken after its entry into force. Hence, if after the crime’s commission a new law comes into force and this law introduces a new medical measure (which is likely to be more efficient as well), the said measure should normally be taken.

It follows that if after the commission of any deed proscribed in the CC a new law on medical measures enters into force, this law shall be normally applicable to all such measures taken from the moment of its entry into force onwards, regardless of whether it foresees harsher measures compared to those in the law in force at the time of the commission of the deed. The new law is applicable unless it contains a transitional provision (usually for pending proceedings) that the old law shall still be applied, instead. That is why even if the new law foresees harsher measures their enforceability is not only acceptable but normal as well.

To recognize and legally allow for this obvious possibility to introduce new, though harsher, measures, the words “or security measures” should be deleted from Section 31, item 3 of the Constitution. The text must remain dedicated only to penalties. It should read: “Penalties not provided for in law at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be enforced”. By doing this the Constitutional legislator will open the way for the necessary flexibility in employment of new and more efficient provisions on security and other similar measures (safety measures, in general). Eventually, such provisions are likely to be more consistent with the idea of Article 2(2)(x) of Law No. 16/2005 for Legislative Authorization on Criminal Matters that any “security measure had to be grounded in the danger posed by the perpetrator” as they are expected to update the legal mechanisms of overcoming the danger.

3. The other unacceptable text of Section 31 of the Constitution is its item 5. It reads:

“Criminal law shall not be enforced retroactively, except if the new law is in favour of the accused.”

Again, the text comes again from the principle of Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali and the aforementioned International Instruments that enshrine it. The problem is that the principle and the said Instruments relate only to crime and penalty, and not to any other criminal law issue.

Thus, the good initial idea of non-retroactivity of detrimental to the actor laws concerning crime and penalty has been expanded and converted into a bad absolute ban on retroactivity of any law that is detrimental to the actor. Actually, the ban on retroactivity should only be valid to those detrimental laws which define crimes and/or penalties. It is not abnormal to pass a retroactive detrimental law which relates not only to safety measures but also to time limitations (lapse of time), or suspended sentences, early release, rehabilitation/expunction as well. For example, after the World War II the period of time limitations for Serious Crimes (namely: Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes) was prolonged to infinity (made endless) by its abolishment. No doubt, this constituted a retroactive detrimental law but this retroactivity was never disputed. In contrast to the retroactivity of the written (non-customary) legal descriptions of the said serious crimes provided for trials over them, the retroactivity of the prolongation to infinity of the time limitations (lapse of time) period has never ever undergone any criticism, despite the circumstance these ex post facto legal provisions were also created to the disadvantage of the defendants: German and Japanese officials.

To recognize and legally allow for the possibility to, where it is really necessary, retroactively employ such new legal provisions which, though detrimental to the actor, are socially justifiable, the text of item 5, quoted above, must be modified in the following way: “Criminal law which defines crimes and penalties shall not be enforced retroactively.” Otherwise, all other criminal law provisions will also remain blocked from being used retroactively, even on an exceptional basis - a situation which would be inconsistent with criminal law history and tradition.

Basically, the fundamental problem in East Timor is that the principle of Nullum crimen, nulla pena sine pravea lege poenali and the bans which derive from it are construed expansively without any justification. This might be observed not only in the unjustified extension of the said principle to non-punitive measures or in the unjustified extension of the derivative ban on retroactivity of provisions foreseeing crimes and/or harsher penalties to any other detrimental to the actor provisions, namely, to provisions that do not envisage crimes and/or penalties. Such an unjustified expansion of a derivative ban might also be noticed, in terms of result, with the inadequate ban on application by analogy (designed to overcome lacunae/gaps in criminal law) of provisions which are not detrimental to the actor, at all. Thus, Article 2(2)(b) of Law No. 16/2005 for Legislative Authorization on Criminal Matters unexceptionally lays down “the prohibition of analogy in respect of the application of criminal law”. In this way, the application of criminal law provisions by analogy has been totally prohibited: not only where the provision available foresees a crime or harsher penalty, or is detrimental to the actor for another reason, but also where the provision is in his/her favour. Actually, criminal law shall not be applied by analogy only IN MALAM PARTEM (Latin: on the bad side) but might be applied by analogy IN BONAM PARTEM (Latin: on the good side) as it is the case with provisions on justifications[4], for example. Obviously, in such cases judiciary can and do resort to analogy.

4. Section 28 (Right to resistance and self-defence) reads:

“Every citizen has the right to disobey and to resist illegal orders or orders that affect their fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees. The right to self-defence is guaranteed to all, in accordance with the law”.

Basically, the text envisages and eventually equalizes two circumstances of entirely different legal nature, namely: disobedience to implementation of illegal orders and self-defence. The first circumstance, the disobedience to implementation of illegal orders, including those that affect their fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees, is not only a matter of right and choice. Above all, it is a matter of duty as everyone is legally prohibited from implementation of such orders; their implementation is illegal too and might also constitute a specific crime. In contrast to the disobedience to implementation of illegal orders, self-defence is generally not a duty and if somebody does not resort to it, his/her conduct is not illegal. In order to clearly distinguish between these two circumstances, they should not be simultaneously called “rights”; disobedience, in particular, must not be relegated to a right, as this word should be reserved for self-defence only. Hence, it would be much better if the title of the Section reads: “Disobedience and self-defence”.

Furthermore, it should be taken into account that while the disobedience to implementation of illegal orders is an obligation, the resistance to their implementation, including implementation of orders that affect citizen’s fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees, is a right. As any such implementation constitutes the unlawful attack which might be resisted though self-defence, the particular right to resist the said implementation of illegal orders, provided for in item 2, is just a specific display of the general right to self-defence provided for in item 2. Therefore, the second part of the text in item 1 actually envisages the subject-matter of item 2 and should be transferred there, accordingly, from the first to the second item.

To be precise, the text should not be just inserted there; it should, actually, replace the text of the second part of item 2 which prescribes that self-defence is performed “in accordance with the law”. This text should be deleted as it focuses on domestic law only. Per argumentum a contrario, it follows from this text that International Instruments are not directly applicable to self-defence which is incompatible with Section 9 (2) of the Constitution: “Rules provided for in international conventions, treaties and agreements shall apply in the internal legal system of East Timor following their approval, ratification or accession by the respective competent organs and after publication in the official gazette.“ Eventually, the second part of item 2 is rather confusing as it means that if an International Instrument, though ratified by and in force for East Timor, sets forth a rule for (requirement for or restriction on) self-defence[5], this rule is not valid in East Timor until embedded (incorporated) in its domestic criminal law. Thus, the Civil Law tradition of direct application of International Instruments is abandoned; instead, the Common Law tradition of enabling legislation for the effective operation of International Instruments should be resorted to. In turn, this is likely to foster endless discussions as to whether other issues (other justifications, other defences to crime, etc.) must not be approached in the same common law way. Such discussions, definitely, are most inappropriate for East Timor these days.

Actually, all rules of International Instruments in force are directly applicable in civil law countries but, having different addressees, are applied in different ways. Where rules of International Instruments envisage new crimes and/or penalties, they are deemed to be addressed to national legislative authorities and require from them the criminalization of one or more conducts and/or the introduction of one or more new penalties. Only then the new crimes and penalties for them (e. g. modern acts of terrorism, organized crime) might be recognized in the country. The necessity for such a legislative intervention at the national level comes again from a ban which derives from the principle of Nullum crimen, nulla pena sine pravea lege poenali, and, in particular, from the derivative ban on defining crimes and penalties in any other way but statutory law. This law is traditionally confined to domestic statutes only and does not include any international conventions[6].

Furthermore, as there is no justification, again, to construe the ban on defining crimes and penalties in non-statutory way expansively, it might be successfully argued that all other rules of International Instruments which impose legal obligations on different issues, other than crimes and penalties, (e. g. on international judicial cooperation, human rights, etc.) do not require any prior legislative intervention for their implementation. Such rules are, therefore, directly addressed to other (judicial and/or law-enforcement) authorities and/or persons and can be implemented by them once the International Instruments are in force for the country. As the International Instruments’ rules on justifications and self-defence, in particular, are not only rules on different issues, other than crimes and penalties, but also rules that are favourable to the actor as well, their direct implementation shall not be denied either. To clearly recognize and confirm this, the second part of item 2 must be unconditionally deleted.

5. Like Section 28, on Disobedience and Defence, Section 94 (Immunities) of the Constitution also envisages and equalizes such two different types of circumstances which must, again, be clearly distinguished between. The Section reads:

“The Members of National Parliament shall not be held liable for civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings in regard to votes and opinions expressed by them while performing their functions. Parliamentary immunities may be withdrawn in accordance with the Rules of Procedures of the National Parliament.”

Undoubtedly, item 1 of this Section is dedicated to Members of Parliament’s immunity in regard to offences committed in giving of opinions (such which generally constitute insult, slander or some other crime) while item 2 is dedicated to Members of Parliament’s immunity in regard to conducts that constitute other crimes. The former type of immunity, determined as substantive, is traditionally not subject to any waiver, while the latter, determined as procedural, is (similarly to the immunity of Government members, according to Section 113, and also of cooperative witnesses, extraditees). Parliamentary opinions, in particular, due to their substantive nature and irrevocable effect, are often called circumstances excluding punishability (or granting impunity). In contrast to procedural immunity, they not only bar criminal proceedings against any Member of Parliament but also, as specific non-exculpatory substantive defences, deprive his/her conduct of its general capacity to entail any criminal responsibility, even though it satisfies (as any ordinary crime) the legal description of a given crime[7]. To sufficiently clarify all this and avoid any misunderstanding Section 94 should read:

“The Members of National Parliament shall not be held liable for civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings in regard to votes and opinions expressed by them while performing their functions. Immunity in regard to crimes committed in other situations may be withdrawn in accordance with the Rules of Procedures of the National Parliament.”

Per argumentum a fortiori, the President of the Republic should enjoy such a status too. S/he must be granted substantive immunity and thus, exempt from any criminal and other responsibility for all his/her conducts (acts and omissions) committed in the exercise of his/her functions except for acts of high treason. His/her position of a President is to be recognized as a circumstance excluding punishability of any wrong conduct committed in the exercise of his/her functions that satisfies the legal description of a given crime except for high treason. Thus, if in the exercise of his/her functions the President of the Republic commits an offence other than high treason, his/her immunity shall never be withdrawn; the withdrawal shall be possible only in respect of high treason. Additionally, if the President of the Republic commits a crime not in the course of exercising of his/her functions, his/her immunity should be withdrawn only where this crime carries a maximum punishment (penalty) of 5 years imprisonment, at least – the threshold of any lower imprisonment might be appropriate for somebody else (such as the 2 years imprisonment in Section 113 for Government members) but not for the President of the Republic. That is why Section 79 (Criminal liability and Constitutional Obligations) of the Constitution should actually read:

“The President of the Republic shall enjoy immunity in the exercise of his or her functions except for high treason. For alleged crimes not committed in the exercise of his or her functions, the President of the Republic shall not enjoy immunity only if they carry a maximum punishment of 5 years or more.

The President of the Republic shall be answerable before the Supreme Court of Justice for acts provided for under the previous item.

It is the incumbent upon the National Parliament to initiate the criminal proceedings and withdraw the immunity of the President of the Republic, following a proposal made by one-fifth, and deliberation approved by a two-third majority, of its Members.

Conviction shall result in forfeiture of office and disqualification from re-election.”

5. Section 33 (Habeas corpus), item 1 of the Constitution reads:

“Anyone who has been illegally deprived of his/her freedom has the right to apply for habeas corpus.”

It might not always be a joke that, if police refers to this text, they can say to any detainee who applies for habeas corpus: “We never detain illegally; that is why we can’t send your application to Court.” Obviously, the word “illegally” should be deleted from the text and the new text should read:

“Anyone who has been deprived of his/her freedom has the right to apply for habeas corpus.”

Otherwise, if the word “illegally” remains in the text, it would be a precondition for access to court. Thus, to enjoy access to court it must be determined in some sort of abnormal preliminary proceedings that the applicant is being illegally detained. Only in such cases the court will seem to be in a position to implement item 3 of the Section, namely: to “rule on the application for habeas corpus within 8 days”.

Therefore, should, contrary to the proposal and normal situation, preliminary proceedings determine that the applicant is being legally detained, then s/he cannot enjoy any access to court for direct control over the legality of his/her detention. Actually, it is and should always be the other way around: as courts actually examine all applicants’ detentions and terminate the illegal ones, the legality of any detention (applicant’s deprivation of liberty) should substantiate only the denial of the detainee’s release rather than the whole court procedure of control over the legality of his/her detention (deprivation of liberty).

6. Section 35, item 3 and 4 (Extradition and expulsion) of the Constitution read:

“Extradition in respect of offences punishable, under the law of the requesting State, by death penalty or life imprisonment or whenever there are grounds to assume that the person to be extradited may be subjected to torture and inhuman, degrading and cruel treatment, shall not be permitted. An East Timorese national shall not be expelled or expatriated from the national territory.”

a. The absolute prohibition of extraditing East Timorese nationals [in the context of Section 35 “expatriation” must include extradition and surrender] does not allow East Timor, first of all, to grant the extradition of any of them even in respect of a crime committed in the requesting country. Moreover, this prohibition is very problematic because, in turn, does not allow East Timor to obtain the extradition of any requested country’s national, even in respect of a crime committed in East Timor, including from civil law countries (such as Indonesia, by virtue of Article 7.2 of her Law on Extradition) which extradite own nationals in respect of crimes committed in the requesting country. Countries like Indonesia extradite either under a treaty or under reciprocity and, as East Timor has no extradition treaty with any of them, such a country, if requested by East Timor for the abovementioned extradition, would inevitably require reciprocity. In the situation, where East Timor would request the extradition of the other country’s national in respect of a crime committed in the territory of East Timor, that country would, in turn, require from East Timor to either have already extradited to that country an East Timorese national in respect of a crime committed in her territory or at least, generally promise to consider the other country’s requests for extradition of East Timorese nationals in respect of crimes committed in that country’s territory. Regretfully, due to the absolute prohibition in item 4, East Timor would never be in the position to make even such a promise. Obviously, the absolute prohibition of extraditing East Timorese nationals should be abandoned by adding in the text of item 4 that such persons can be also extradited under international treaty with the requesting country or reciprocity with her, at least, in respect of crimes committed in her territory.

Besides, given the Constitutional level of the prohibition in item 4 and the impossibility of international instruments to override the Constitution, East Timor cannot implement any international treaty (bilateral or multilateral) which provides for the extradition of own nationals. East Timor has acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court whose Article 89 (1) reads: “The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the material supporting the request …, to any State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender”. Given the absolute Constitutional prohibition in item 4 of extraditing East Timorese nationals, it would be interesting to see how East Timor will fulfill its international obligations, if requested to surrender to the International Criminal Court an East Timorese national in respect of a crime under the jurisdiction of this Court committed in Africa (e. g. Sudan, Uganda), for example.

b. It would be wise to also abandon the absolute prohibition in item 3 of extraditing in respect of crimes which carry the death penalty in the requesting country by adding in the text the words: unless the requesting country gives assurance that the death penalty will not be carried out (imposed/executed)[8]. Otherwise, extradition would be blocked even in such cases where the death penalty would for sure be excluded by commuting it to some imprisonment and the extraditee would not be in any actual danger of the death penalty that was initially provided for his/her crime. This inability to extradite might turn East Timor into an attractive destination for most serious offenders whose crimes merit no less than death penalty. Such persons might only be expelled from East Timor and, as not being arrested in another country, are likely to return to her territory to create new problems.

Apart from this, it might be proposed that life imprisonment should be deleted as an impediment for extradition. The problem is that most countries, other than those under the influence of Portugal or Spain, have such a punishment, do not foresee any legal mechanism for its commutation and therefore, can not react to any requirement to exclude it prior to obtaining extradition. That is why the commutation of this punishment should be achieved by virtue of international treaties rather than required unilaterally. Otherwise, if East Timor refuses extradition also to countries that do not exclude life imprisonment, it is likely to become a safe haven, at least temporary (but several times), for people whose behaviour deserves such imprisonment, in general.

Alternatively, should life imprisonment remain as an impediment to extradition, it should be provided for in ordinary law rather than the Constitution. As in most other countries, the impediment must be in ordinary domestic law on extradition. Otherwise, if it is in the Constitution and cannot be overridden by any international treaty, not many countries would be interested in negotiating and signing extradition treaties with East Timor.

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[1] The parallel ban on retroactivity of laws on crimes in not being discussed here.

[2] See Article 3 of the Bulgarian Criminal Procedure Code [CPC], § 3 (2) of the Estonian CPC, Article 4 of the Russian CPC, Article 1.02 (ii) of the CPC of Texas, etc.

[3] E. g. Section 2 (6) of the German CC reads: “Unless otherwise provided by statute, measures of rehabilitation and security shall be governed by the statute in force at the time of the decision.” Article 112-1 (3) of the French CC, Article 3 (4) of the Georgian CC, Article 7 (3) of the Turkish CC stipulate the same.

[4] E. g. provisions on Self-Defence (Necessary Defence) to detention of criminals, provisions on Necessity to situations of justified risk (where, of course, they are not dealt with in the CC) as such provisions are favourable to the actor. Only provisions which are detrimental to him/her (both, relating to crimes and/or penalties, and not) are not applicable by analogy. See Article 46 (3) of the Bulgarian Law on Normative Acts, Article 2 (3) of the Turkish CC.

[5] Such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms whose Article 2(2)(a) reads: “Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence.”

[6] An argument in support of this restrictive view is that no international convention fully specifies crimes or penalties; this job is left to national Parliaments. That is why international conventions are always in violation with another derivative ban, that of “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege certa” [lat.: “no crime, no penalty without a certain/clearly defining law”] and can not be any direct source for the definition of crimes or penalties.

[7] It is noteworthy that in legal systems where punishability is an inherent element of any crime, such conducts (acts, omissions) are not considered crimes at all. They are unlawful, committed with guilty mind [as they complete, respectively, all the physical and mental legal indications of a given crime: its actus reus and mens rea] and are also socially dangerous but lack punishability under the CC. Usually, the circumstances excluding punishability are provided for in the CC rather than the Constitution.

[8] By virtue of a national legal provision, such as the following: "If the offence for which extradition is requested carries the death penalty under the law of the requesting State and is not punishable under the law of [country adopting the law], extradition [shall not be granted] [may be refused], unless the competent authorities of the requesting State give assurances considered sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out"{ Section 12 (Death Penalty) of the 2004 UNOCD Model Law on Extradition.

Published in the East Timor Law Journal on 04 June 2008

1 comment:

  1. [...] Command for PNTL & F-FDTL Undermines Rule of Law & Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste 3. Criminal Justice in East Timor and the Constitution of East Timor 4. Commentary on the Draft Arms [...]

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Index

2011

1. The Rule of Law: Theoretical, Cultural and Legal Challenges for Timor-Leste

2010


2009


2008


1. Justice for Serious Crimes Committed during 1999 in Timor-Leste: Where to From Here?

2. Joint Command for PNTL & F-FDTL Undermines Rule of Law & Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste

3. Criminal Justice in East Timor and the Constitution of East Timor

4. Commentary on the Draft Arms Law in Timor-Leste

5. Deleted

2007

1. The Law on Political Parties (No 3/2004) & the Decision of the Timor-Leste Court of Appeal in the case of Vitor da Costa & Ors v Fretilin

2. Ethnicity, Violence & Land & Property Disputes in Timor-Leste

3. East Timor: Reconciliation & Reconstruction

4. Legal opinion on the appointment of the Prime Minister and the formation of Government in Timor-Leste

5. A legal opinion on the Formation of an Unconstitutional Government in Timor-Leste

6. Commission for Truth Friendship East Timor Competing Concepts of Justice

7. 25th of May 2006 Massacre & War Crimes in Timor-Leste

2006

1. Some Land Tenure Issues in Post-Conflict East Timor

2. Extradition from Indonesia to East Timor & the Serious Crimes Process in East Timor 1999 - 2005

3. East Timor: Internal Security, States of Seige & Emergency: A Note on the Constitutional Provisions & the Internal Security Law 2003

4. East Timor: The Constitutional Process Governing the Dismissal of the Government

5. Guidelines for Preparation of Outgoing Requests by East Timor for International Judicial Assisstance - Extradition Requests & Letters Rogatory - A Practice Manual

6. Roles of the President and the Prime Minister in the Current Constitutional Crisis in East Timor

7. Institutions & the East Timorese Experience

8. An Early Warning System for Timor-Leste: A Framework Concept of the Need & Possibility of an Early Warning System for the Timorese People

2005

1. The Timor-Leste Maritime Boundaries Case

2. Deleted

3. On the occasion of the International Conference on Traditional Dispute Resolution & Traditional Justice in Timor-Leste

4. General Facts on the Timor Sea & Facts on the Negotiations on a Permanent Maritime Boundary between Timor-Leste & Australia

5. Deleted

6. Morality, Religion & the Law: Abortion & Prosititution in East Timor

2004

1. A Note on Land Rights in East Timor (Indonesian Government Regulation No 18 of 1991 on the Conversion of Land Rights in East Timor) & the Purported Suspension of Article 5 by Government Regulation No 24 of 1992

2. UNTAET Land Policy


3. Some Observations on UNTAET Regulation No 27/2000 on the Temporary Prohibition on Transactions in Land by Indonesian Citizens

4. Sandalwood & Environmental Law in East Timor

5. Some Observations on the Report on Research Findings & Policy Recommendations for a Legal Framework for Land Dispute Mediation in East Timor

6. An Overview of East Timor's Law No 1 of 2003 on the Juridical Regime on Immovable Properties

7. Report on Research into Adat Land Law in East Timor

8. Short Analysis of UNTAET Executive Order No 2 of 2002 on the Decriminalisation of Defamation

9. An Overview of the Constitutional Drafting Process in East Timor

10. Some Notes on East Timor Government Decree No 1/2004 on the Orthographical Standard of the Tetum Language

11. UNTAET Guidelines for the Administration of Public & Abandoned Property by District Administrations

12. Tara Bandu: The Adat Concept of the Environment in East Timor

13. Finding Ways of Resolving Land Problems in East Timor